Russia's military potential is initially perceived as very impressive. At the same time, not every citizen of the Russian Federation can clearly imagine the structure of the defense sector of their country. In addition, this information was not always available. Therefore, there is every reason to pay attention to the structure of the military-industrial complex.

Military-industrial complex of Russia

Regarding this topic, it is initially worth noting that the military-industrial complex can be safely attributed to an industry that has had a more than tangible impact on the development of the economy over many years of the existence of the Russian Federation.

And although some time ago such a concept as the Russian military-industrial complex was somewhat vague, in the mid-2000s progress in this area became obvious. If we talk about the current situation, it is worth mentioning the fact that the military-industrial complex has many progressive industries:

Aviation industry;

Nuclear;

Rocket and space;

Production of ammunition and ammunition;

Military shipbuilding, etc.

The following enterprises can be identified as the main players that deserve attention within the framework of the military-industrial complex:

- "Russian Technologies";

- "Rosoboronexport";

OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey, etc.

What does the structure of the military industry look like?

Within the framework of this topic, it is necessary to initially highlight the following information: during the active 90s, the wave of privatization did not bypass the enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Russia. Therefore, if you now analyze the ownership structure of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, you can easily notice that most of it consists of joint stock companies. More specifically, there are 57% of such joint-stock companies in the entire military-industrial complex. At the same time, there is no state share in 28.2% of such enterprises.

You can also refer to other data provided by the Accounts Chamber. According to this information, approximately 230 enterprises operate within the aviation industry. But only 7 of them belong to the state (we are talking about a controlling stake).

One of the key features of Russian enterprises can be identified as their jurisdiction in various forms to federal organizations. At the moment, the structure of the Russian military-industrial complex includes 5 government agencies that oversee the defense industries and are located in:

RACE. Operates in the field of communications and radio industry.

- "Rossudostroenie". Responsible for supervising shipbuilding production.

CANCER. Controls processes within the rocket, space and aviation industries.

RAV. In this case we are talking about the arms industry.

- "Rosboepripasy". This agency specializes in working with the specialty chemicals and ammunition industries.

Key elements of the military-industrial complex

If we consider the features of the Russian military-industrial complex, we cannot ignore the types of organizations that are part of it:

Design bureaus that are focused on working with prototypes of weapons.

Research organizations. Their main task is theoretical developments.

Manufacturing enterprises. In this case, resources are used to mass produce weapons.

Test sites and testing laboratories. It makes sense to talk about several important tasks here. This is the so-called fine-tuning of prototypes under real operating conditions, as well as testing weapons that have just rolled off the production line.

In order to paint a complete picture of the functioning of the military-industrial complex and identify all the facets that the Russian military-industrial complex has, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that enterprises that are part of the defense sector also produce products that have a civilian purpose.

Now it’s worth taking a closer look at the military-industrial complex

Nuclear weapons complex

It is difficult to imagine the development of military-industrial without this direction. It includes several strategically important areas of production.

First of all, this is the subsequent production of a concentrate from these raw materials. The next important step is the separation of uranium isotopes (enrichment process). This task is performed at enterprises located in cities such as Angarsk, Novouralsk, Zelenogorsk and Seversk.

To be fair, it is worth noting that 45% of all capacities that are concentrated in Russia are located in Russia. At the same time, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the production of nuclear weapons is being reduced and the industries described above are focusing on Western customers.

Another task of this military-industrial complex is to both develop and allocate its reserves, concentrated in the Russian Federation, will last for many more years.

Enterprises operating within the nuclear weapons complex are also involved in the manufacture of fuel elements that are necessary for the operation of nuclear reactors, the assembly of nuclear weapons and the disposal of radioactive waste.

Rocket and space industry

It can rightfully be called one of the most knowledge-intensive. Just look at the cost of an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) alone, for the full operation of which approximately 300 thousand different systems, instruments and parts are required. And if we talk about a large space complex, then this figure increases to 10 million.

It is for this reason that the largest number of scientists, engineers and designers are concentrated in this industry.

Aviation industry

When studying the military-industrial complex of Russia, the industries and directions of this area, attention must be paid to aviation in any case. Here it is relevant to talk about large industrial centers, since head enterprises are needed to assemble products. Others simply do not have the necessary technical base to organize the processes required for fast and high-quality production.

In this case, two key conditions must always be met: the availability of qualified specialists and well-organized transport links. The Russian military-industrial complex and specifically the aviation sector are in a state of constant development, which allows the Russian Federation to act as a major exporter of weapons, including aviation.

Artillery and small arms

This is also an important industry. The Russian military-industrial complex can hardly be imagined without the famous Kalashnikov assault rifle. This is the most widespread type of small arms currently produced in Russia.

Moreover, outside the CIS it was adopted by 55 states. As for artillery systems, their production centers are located in cities such as Perm, Yekaterinburg and Nizhny Novgorod.

Armor industry

If you pay attention to the centers of the Russian military-industrial complex, then after simple analytics you can draw an obvious conclusion: this direction of the defense industry can be defined as one of the most developed.

The tanks themselves are produced in Omsk and Nizhny Tagil. The factories located in Chelyabinsk and St. Petersburg are at the stage of repurposing. As for armored personnel carriers, their production is carried out by enterprises in Kurgan and Arzamas.

Military shipbuilding

Without it, the Russian military-industrial complex cannot be considered complete.

At the same time, the largest production center in this area is St. Petersburg. Within this city there are up to 40 enterprises related to shipbuilding.

Regarding the topic of nuclear submarines, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that at the moment their production is carried out only in Severodvinsk.

What you should know about military-industrial complex conversion

In this case, we are talking about changes in the military industry, and more specifically, about its transition to the civilian market. This strategy can be explained very simply: the production capacities that currently exist are capable of producing significantly more military products than actual demand requires. That is, neither Russia itself nor its current and potential clients need that much.

Given this prospect, one obvious maneuver remains: to reorient some military enterprises to produce products that are relevant in the civilian sector. Thus, jobs will be preserved, factories will continue their stable operation, and the state will make a profit. Complete harmony.

The use of the military, so to speak, for peaceful purposes is also promising for the reason that at such enterprises there is a significant concentration of advanced technologies and specialists with a high level of qualifications.

Using such a strategy, it is possible to solve at least some of the problems of the Russian military-industrial complex. At the same time, stable production of the most relevant equipment for the army is maintained.

Obvious difficulties

Based on the information presented above, it is easy to conclude that the same conversion is not an easy task. In fact, it can be considered one of the most difficult tasks facing the military-industrial complex. There are no simple solutions here by definition. In order for any progress to be observed in this area, significant efforts must be constantly made.

Another problem that we have to face is the uncertainty of the future financing of military-industrial complex enterprises. The military-industrial complex of Russia can receive funds from the state only for those enterprises that are part of any federal program or are classified as state-owned production facilities.

As for foreign investment, there is no reason to count on it confidently yet. At the same time, factories that have production lines that are already outdated or are not capable of producing a wide range of competitive products, and military products in particular, may find themselves in a particularly difficult situation.

If we try to assess the economic state of defense enterprises as a whole, we can conclude that it is very heterogeneous. The point is that there are factories whose products have a certain demand. At the same time, there are also those enterprises that are in a state of deep production crisis, regardless of the fact whether they belong to the state or not.

Nevertheless, one must be aware that the government is recording the state of some components of the military-industrial complex. This confirms the fact that the Coordination Council approved the main directions of development and stabilization of the situation.

In addition, in Russia there is an active unification of fundamental and applied scientific areas within the framework of the activities of military enterprises, which significantly increases the chances of the military-industrial complex for successful development and full-fledged functioning. Well-organized efforts are also being made to ensure maximum compliance of the products that come off the assembly line of military-industrial complex enterprises with the investment expectations of the Russian and foreign markets.

Results

It is obvious that, despite the difficult situation surrounding the military-industrial complex, there are definitely chances for a bright future and a progressive present. The government is constantly working to make the necessary changes that will allow defense enterprises to operate as efficiently as possible.

Development of the domestic defense-industrial complex

1.2 Geography and factors of location of military-industrial complex industries

The military-industrial complex consists of several main industries:

Production of nuclear weapons;

Aviation industry;

Rocket and space industry;

Production of small arms;

Production of artillery systems;

Military shipbuilding;

Armor industry.

The aviation industry is represented in the military-industrial complex by 220 enterprises and 150 scientific organizations. The bulk of them are located in the Volga and Ural regions, in large industrial centers, where finished products are assembled at the main enterprises from parts and assemblies supplied by hundreds (and sometimes thousands) of subcontractors. The main factors for locating production enterprises are the convenience of transport links and the availability of qualified labor. And the design of almost all types of Russian aircraft is carried out by the Moscow and Moscow region design bureaus. The only exception is the Beriev Design Bureau in Taganrog, where amphibious aircraft are produced.

The ammunition and special chemicals industry includes about 100 enterprises engaged in the development and production of ammunition. The main part is concentrated in the Center. Russia and Siberia.

The arms industry consists of more than 100 enterprises developing and producing missile systems (except anti-aircraft and space systems), tanks, artillery weapons, small arms, special optics and optoelectronics. It accounts for over 1/5 of the total production volume of the military-industrial complex. Enterprises in the industry are located mainly in the Ural-Volga region and the Central economic regions.

The communications and radio industry unites 200 enterprises and just under 200 scientific organizations that develop and produce communications, television and radio equipment. These industries traditionally have a high share of civilian products and produce 90% of televisions and 75% of audio equipment in Russia. There are enterprises in the industry in all economic regions of the Russian Federation.

The rocket and space technology industry includes over 70 enterprises and more than 60 scientific organizations engaged in the development and production of anti-aircraft missile systems and space technology (Center, Ural).

The shipbuilding industry includes over 200 enterprises producing all types of civil and military ships, parts and assemblies for them (located in the North-Western, Northern, Volga-Vyatka and Far Eastern regions).

The electronics industry is the most dispersed: about 500 enterprises and organizations produce microcircuits, semiconductors, radio components (Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Tomsk and some others).

A feature of the military-industrial complex is the location of many of its enterprises in “closed” cities, which until recently were not mentioned anywhere, they were not even marked on geographical maps. Only recently did they receive real names, and before that they were designated by numbers (for example, Chelyabinsk-70).

The nuclear weapons complex is part of the Russian nuclear industry. It includes the following productions:

1. Extraction of uranium ore and production of uranium concentrate. In Russia, only one uranium mine is currently operating in Krasnokamensk (Chita region). Uranium concentrate is also produced there.

2. Uranium enrichment (separation of uranium isotopes) occurs in the cities of Novouralsk (Svedlovsk-44), Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45), Seversk (Tomsk-7) and Angarsk. Russia has 45% of the world's uranium enrichment capacity. With the decline in nuclear weapons production, these industries are becoming increasingly export-oriented. The products of these enterprises go both to civilian nuclear power plants and to the production of nuclear weapons and industrial reactors for the production of plutonium.

3. The production of fuel elements (fuel rods) for nuclear reactors is carried out in Elektrostal and Novosibirsk.

4. The production and separation of weapons-grade plutonium is now carried out in Seversk (Tomsk-7) and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). Russia's plutonium reserves have accumulated for many years to come, but the nuclear reactors in these cities do not stop, since they provide them with heat and electricity. Previously, a major center of plutonium production was Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65), where in 1957, due to a failure of the cooling system, one of the containers in which liquid production waste was stored exploded. As a result, an area of ​​23 thousand km was contaminated with radioactive waste.

5. The assembly of nuclear weapons took place in Sarov (Arzamas-16), Zarechny (Penza-19), Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45) and Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-16). The development of prototypes was carried out in Sarov and Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). The first atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed in Sarov, where the Russian Federal Nuclear Center is now located.

6. Disposal of nuclear waste is one of the most difficult environmental problems today. The main center is Snezhinsk, where waste is processed and buried in rocks.

The rocket and space industry is one of the most knowledge-intensive and technically complex industries. For example, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) contains up to 300 thousand systems, subsystems, individual instruments and parts, and a large space complex contains up to 10 million. Therefore, there are much more scientists, designers and engineers in this field than workers.

Research and development organizations in the industry are concentrated largely in the Moscow region. ICBMs (in Moscow and Reutov), ​​rocket engines (in Khimki and Korolev), cruise missiles (in Dubna and Reutov), ​​and anti-aircraft missiles (in Khimki) are being developed here.

The production of these products is scattered throughout almost all of Russia. ICBMs are produced in Votkinsk (Udmurtia), ballistic missiles for submarines - in Zlatoust and Krasnoyarsk. Launch vehicles for launching spacecraft are produced in Moscow, Samara and Omsk. Spacecraft are produced there, as well as in St. Petersburg, Istra, Khimki, Korolev, and Zheleznogorsk. The main cosmodrome of the former USSR was Baikonur (in Kazakhstan), and in Russia now the only operating cosmodrome is in the city of Mirny, Arkhangelsk region (near the Plesetsk station). Anti-aircraft missile systems are being tested at the Kapustin Yar training ground in the Astrakhan region.

The military space forces and all unmanned spacecraft are controlled from the city of Krasnoznamensk (Golitsyno-2), and manned ones are controlled from the flight control center (MCC) in the city of Korolev, Moscow Region.

Artillery and small arms are a very important branch of the military-industrial complex.

The most famous and widespread type of small arms produced is the Kalashnikov assault rifle, which is used in at least 55 countries (and in some it is even depicted on the state emblem). The main centers for the production of small arms are Tula, Kovrov, Izhevsk, Vyatskie Polyany (Kirov region), and the leading scientific center is located in Klimovsk (Moscow region).

Artillery systems are produced mainly in Yekaterinburg, Perm, and Nizhny Novgorod.

Until recently, all information on such an industry of the military-industrial complex as the production of armored vehicles was closed. In recent years, in connection with the general course towards greater openness, the commercial interest of manufacturers in advertising their products, and the desire to expand exports, many publications about production in the military-industrial complex have appeared in the media and specialized literature. The production of armored vehicles, along with automobile, tractor and aircraft construction, is a symbol of the second industrial and scientific-technical revolution, which unfolded in the 30s. in USSR. I will dwell in more detail on the history of tank building in Russia.

Before the revolution, despite the presence of several original projects, tanks were not produced in Russia (only two prototypes were built). On the basis of domestic and mainly foreign cars, armored vehicles were assembled by the Izhora, Putilov and Obukhov plants in the country's leading mechanical engineering hub - Petrograd.

During the Civil War, production of armored vehicles, including half-tracks, continued. The first small series of light tanks (15 pieces) was built at the Sormovsky plant in Nizhny Novgorod in 1920. A French captured tank was used as a sample.

As a result of the development of the concept of the first Soviet tank at the Leningrad Bolshevik plant (Obukhov plant) in 1927-1931. The first large series of light tanks MS-1 (900 pieces) was produced, and in Kharkov, the leading industrial hub of Ukraine, at the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after the Comintern (KhPZ) in 1930. The production of a small series of T-24 medium tanks was organized.

Since the beginning of the 30s. Large-scale production of tanks based on advanced foreign models began. This was due to the fact that the modernization capabilities of products previously produced on the basis of captured samples were exhausted, and there was no domestic tank building school. In fact, in scientific and technical terms, the country remained dependent on Western technological innovations in this area.

Licenses for the production of tanks were purchased in other countries, and new armored vehicles were created on the basis of foreign projects. Then the armored industry was able to come forward, and most importantly, a national tank building school was created.

During the Great Patriotic War, the geography of domestic tank building expanded sharply, especially to the territory of the Urals and the Volga region. The T-34 tanks that found the most widespread use in the war were produced at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Gorky, as well as at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) and Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil.

In the post-war years until the end of the 80s. Mass production of armored vehicles continued. The main centers of tank production remained Nizhny Tagil, Omsk, Kharkov, Leningrad, and Chelyabinsk.

Now the leading centers for the production of armored vehicles are:

St. Petersburg (Kirov Plant - T-80 tanks and self-propelled guns);

Nizhny Novgorod (Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant - guns for the BMP-3 and combat turrets for the Tunguska air defense system);

Omsk (transport engineering plant - T-80U tanks, and many others.

Military shipbuilding is difficult to separate from civilian shipbuilding, since until recently most Russian shipyards worked for defense.

The largest shipbuilding center since the time of Peter I is St. Petersburg, where there are about 40 enterprises in this industry. Almost all types of ships were built here. Nuclear submarines are currently being produced in Severodvinsk. Other centers of military shipbuilding are Kaliningrad and a number of cities on rivers where small ships are produced (Yaroslavl, Rybinsk, Zelenodolsk, etc.)

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1. Characteristics of the Russian military-industrial complex

The military-industrial complex (MIC) of Russia is a powerful system of enterprises producing military equipment, weapons and ammunition. The terms “military industry” and “defense industry” are also used as synonyms for the military-industrial complex.

The military-industrial complex includes:

• - research organizations (their task is theoretical developments);
• - design bureaus (KB) creating prototypes (prototypes) of weapons;
• - testing laboratories and testing grounds, where, firstly, the “finishing” of prototypes takes place in real conditions, and secondly, the testing of weapons that have just left the factory walls;
• - manufacturing enterprises where mass production of weapons is carried out.

But in addition to military products, military-industrial complex enterprises produce civilian products. Most of the refrigerators, tape recorders, computer equipment, vacuum cleaners and washing machines in Russia were produced at military-industrial complex enterprises. And televisions, video recorders, cameras and sewing machines were produced only in military factories.

Thus, the military-industrial complex concentrates the production of more complex products. This was facilitated by the high technical level of most military-industrial complex enterprises. This was the sector of the national economy in which production was at the level of the best world standards, and in many cases exceeded it.

The military-industrial complex concentrated the most qualified and proactive personnel, the best equipment and skilled production organizers. Its scale was enormous. At the end of the 80s. About 4.5 million people were employed at 1,800 enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex, including 800 thousand in the field of science. This represented about a quarter of those employed in industry. Taking into account family members, 12-15 million people were directly connected with him, that is, every tenth resident of Russia.

The costs of maintaining the army and the military-industrial complex were borne by the entire population of the country, lowering their standard of living. In the defense industry, the prevailing belief was that the most important thing was to produce as much product as possible.

A feature of the military-industrial complex is the location of many of its enterprises in “closed” cities, which until recently were not mentioned anywhere, they were not even marked on geographical maps. Only recently did they receive real names, and before that they were designated by numbers (for example, Chelyabinsk-70).

The military-industrial complex consists of several main industries:

• - Production of nuclear weapons
• - Aviation industry
• - Rocket and space industry
• - Production of small arms
• - Production of artillery systems
• - Military shipbuilding
• - Armored industry.

The nuclear weapons complex is part of the Russian nuclear industry. It includes the following productions.

• 1. Extraction of uranium ore and production of uranium concentrate. In Russia, only one uranium mine is currently operating in Krasnokamensk (Chita region). Uranium concentrate is also produced there.
• 2. Uranium enrichment (separation of uranium isotopes) occurs in the cities of Novouralsk (Svedlovsk-44), Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45), Seversk (Tomsk-7) and Angarsk. Russia has 45% of the world's uranium enrichment capacity. With the decline in nuclear weapons production, these industries are becoming increasingly export-oriented. The products of these enterprises go both to civilian nuclear power plants and to the production of nuclear weapons and industrial reactors for the production of plutonium.
• 3. The production of fuel elements (fuel rods) for nuclear reactors is carried out in Elektrostal and Novosibirsk.
• 4. The production and separation of weapons-grade plutonium is now carried out in Seversk (Tomsk-7) and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). Russia's plutonium reserves have accumulated for many years to come, but the nuclear reactors in these cities do not stop, since they provide them with heat and electricity. Previously, a major center of plutonium production was Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65), where in 1957, due to a failure of the cooling system, one of the containers in which liquid production waste was stored exploded. As a result, an area of ​​23 thousand km was contaminated with radioactive waste.
• 5. The assembly of nuclear weapons took place in Sarov (Arzamas-16), Zarechny (Penza-19), Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45) and Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-16). The development of prototypes was carried out in Sarov and Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). The first atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed in Sarov, where the Russian Federal Nuclear Center is now located.
• 6. Disposal of nuclear waste is one of the most difficult environmental problems today. The main center is Snezhinsk, where waste is processed and buried in rocks. military industry manufacturing weapons

The aviation industry is located, as a rule, in large industrial centers, where finished products are assembled at parent enterprises from parts and assemblies supplied by hundreds (and sometimes thousands) of subcontractors. The main factors for locating production enterprises are the convenience of transport links and the availability of qualified labor. And the design of almost all types of Russian aircraft is carried out by the Moscow and Moscow region design bureaus. The only exception is the Beriev Design Bureau in Taganrog, where amphibious aircraft are produced.

The rocket and space industry is one of the most knowledge-intensive and technically complex industries. For example, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) contains up to 300 thousand systems, subsystems, individual instruments and parts, and a large space complex contains up to 10 million. Therefore, there are many more scientists, designers and engineers in this field than workers.

Research and development organizations in the industry are concentrated largely in the Moscow region. ICBMs (in Moscow and Reutov), ​​rocket engines (in Khimki and Korolev), cruise missiles (in Dubna and Reutov), ​​and anti-aircraft missiles (in Khimki) are being developed here.

And the production of these products is scattered throughout almost all of Russia. ICBMs are produced in Votkinsk (Udmurtia), ballistic missiles for submarines - in Zlatoust and Krasnoyarsk. Launch vehicles for launching spacecraft are produced in Moscow, Samara and Omsk. Spacecraft are produced there, as well as in St. Petersburg, Istra, Khimki, Korolev, and Zheleznogorsk.

The main cosmodrome of the former USSR was Baikonur (in Kazakhstan), and in Russia now the only operating cosmodrome is in the city of Mirny, Arkhangelsk region (near the Plesetsk station). Anti-aircraft missile systems are being tested at the Kapustin Yar training ground in the Astrakhan region.

The military space forces and all unmanned spacecraft are controlled from the city of Krasnoznamensk (Golitsyno-2), and manned ones are controlled from the flight control center (MCC) in the city of Korolev, Moscow Region.

Artillery and small arms are a very important branch of the military-industrial complex. The most famous and widespread type of small arms produced is the Kalashnikov assault rifle, which is used in at least 55 countries (and in some it is even depicted on the state emblem).

The main centers for the production of small arms are Tula, Kovrov, Izhevsk, Vyatskie Polyany (Kirov region), and the leading scientific center is located in Klimovsk (Moscow region). Artillery systems are produced mainly in Yekaterinburg, Perm, Nizhny Novgorod.

The armored industry was one of the most developed branches of the military-industrial complex. Over the last period, factories of the former USSR produced 100 thousand tanks. Now a significant part of them is subject to destruction within the framework of the Arms Limitation Treaty in Europe. Of the four Russian factories, tanks are now produced at only two - in Nizhny Tagil and Omsk, while the factories in St. Petersburg and Chelyabinsk are being repurposed. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) are produced in Arzamas, and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) are produced in Kurgan.

Military shipbuilding is difficult to separate from civilian shipbuilding, since until recently most Russian shipyards worked for defense. The largest shipbuilding center since the time of Peter I is St. Petersburg, where there are about 40 enterprises in this industry. Almost all types of ships were built here. Nuclear submarines were previously produced in Nizhny Novgorod and Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Currently, their production remains only in Severodvinsk. Other centers of military shipbuilding are a number of cities on rivers where small ships are produced (Yaroslavl, Rybinsk, Zelenodolsk, etc.).

Speaking about the Russian military-industrial complex, one cannot fail to mention such a concept as the conversion of the military-industrial complex (from the Latin word conversic - change, transformation). It means transferring military production to civilian products. This is vitally important for Russia, since it is economically impossible to maintain the previous volumes of arms production, and even from a purely military point of view it is not necessary, since former potential adversaries become Russia’s partners. At the same time, the most advanced technologies are concentrated in the military-industrial complex. It is necessary to preserve them during conversion so that qualified personnel can contribute to the creation of new civilian industries.

At the same time, it is necessary to maintain the production of the most effective types of military equipment in order to be able to equip the Russian army with the most modern weapons, as well as supply weapons to other countries. Until recently, all information on such an industry of the military-industrial complex as the production of armored vehicles was closed. In recent years, in connection with the general course towards greater openness, the commercial interest of manufacturers in advertising their products, and the desire to expand exports, many publications about production in the military-industrial complex have appeared in the media and specialized literature.

Russia has actually lost most of the traditional markets for its weapons. Foreign firms compete not only in the trade of new equipment, but even in the modernization of Soviet equipment of past decades, which is in service with the armies of a number of countries. The problem of reviving domestic production is now becoming increasingly urgent.

Another problem facing the military-industrial complex is the problem of conversion. It is too complex, has no simple solutions, and requires constant attention and time. Even in the United States, a country with a developed market economy and a powerful civilian industrial sector, it required a large-scale structural maneuver and a radical change in the entire system of procurement of weapons and military equipment.

The economy of the USSR historically developed as a militarized economy, oriented towards a purely cost-intensive production structure, incapable of competition, oriented towards a closed domestic market. Attempts at reforms made in some years failed. One got the impression that the created system was not capable of reform through evolutionary means.

The military-industrial or defense complex itself gradually became isolated into an independent organizational structure, which included a management system, enterprises and organizations of nine ministries. The defense complex developed and produced far more than just military equipment. For example, in 1989, the share of non-food consumer goods and civilian products in the total production of the defense complex amounted to 40%. This, in particular, was facilitated by the transfer of enterprises from the reformed Ministry of Light and Food Industry to the defense complex in 1987. There are frequent cases when the share of military production at defense enterprises did not exceed 10%, and a number of enterprises belonging to the defense ministries did not produce any military products at all. On the other hand, military products were produced by enterprises in those industries that were not organizationally part of the defense complex.

For a long time, the defense complex was provided with priority financial resources, scientific and technical personnel, and material resources. As a result of this, enterprises of the defense complex secured high characteristics of material and personnel potential in relation to enterprises and organizations in other sectors of the national economy, which determined the level of scientific and technical achievements in the country and the pace of scientific and technological progress. Taking into account the position that the defense industry complex occupied in the country's economy and the weakness of civilian industries, when developing the conversion program, the concept of “physical” conversion was adopted, that is, the direct repurposing of the production capacities of the defense industry for the production of civilian products. The production and scientific and technical potential of the defense industries, released as a result of the reduction in the development of weapons and military equipment, was to be used as a matter of priority for the implementation of state Union target programs ensuring the implementation of the most important areas of scientific and technological progress, including the development of civil aviation, shipbuilding, space program of scientific and national economic significance, communications, electronic equipment and computer science, production of advanced materials and high-purity compounds, environmentally friendly energy, non-food consumer goods, technological equipment for processing industries of the agro-industrial complex, light industry, trade and public catering, medical equipment , equipment and instruments for environmental purposes. The program provided for the creation of 22 basic intersectoral scientific, technical, technological, engineering and other centers for the conversion of the scientific and technical potential of the defense complex. The adopted conversion program could only be implemented in the conditions of a planned distribution economy and was associated with the largest costs for both the development and industrial development of new products.

Another problem is the transition beyond the critical minimum volume of production of many types of military products. In general, the state defense order in recent years for the bulk of weapons and military equipment ensures that production capacity is loaded by a maximum of 10-15%. Everywhere, defense orders have fallen below the minimum acceptable level, which leads to an increase in costs per unit of output, as well as to the degradation and loss of high-tech industries. Today it is realized that the conversion had to be carried out less hastily and at much lower costs. World experience and the state of Russian enterprises being converted confirm that the high pace of this process causes dire consequences and turns the demilitarization of the economy into one of the factors in the decline of industrial production as a whole. The scale and pace of conversion in the early 90s exceeded those in most developed countries by almost an order of magnitude and ranged from 30 to 60% or more in various sectors of the military-industrial complex. The objective difficulties of the conversion were aggravated by its limited financing. Privatization at military-industrial complex enterprises was accompanied by the cessation of state funding, which is quite natural. However, the new owners, especially labor collectives, turned out to be unable to invest in production, especially its defense part. As a result, a large-scale and difficult-to-control for the state process of enterprises leaving the production of weapons and military equipment began, an unjustified judgment in the range of military products, which was practically not supported by the progressive unification of weapons and military equipment. In subsequent years, this situation worsened even more.

However, the main problem of the military-industrial complex is the meager funding. In this area, the generally accepted indicators in world statistics are annual military expenditures per one military personnel and one resident of the country. In 1997, spending per serviceman in Russia was 14 thousand dollars, in the USA - 176 thousand, in Great Britain - 200, in Germany - 98. In the same year, military spending per capita was: in Russia - 233 dollars, in the USA -978, in the UK - 578, in Greece - $517. Actual state budget expenditures on defense in 1993 amounted to 4.4% of GDP; in 1994 - 5.6%, in 1995 - less than 4%, in 1996 - 3.5%, in 1997 - 2.7%. At the same time, the volume of GDP itself has been continuously declining. The limited ability to finance the state defense order for the supply of specific types of weapons and military equipment to the Armed Forces led to the idea of ​​concentrating most of the resources allocated for this purpose on R&D in the field of creating new types of weapons. This idea, according to experts, was absolutely correct. Its implementation would make it possible to create scientific, technical and technological foundations for the subsequent rearmament of the Armed Forces with qualitatively new weapons and military equipment systems.

It is absolutely clear that today it is unacceptable for Russia to lag behind the leading countries militarily and economically in this area. The world is on the threshold of another scientific and technological revolution, which should lead to a significant qualitative breakthrough in the modernization of currently operating weapons and military equipment, the emergence of fundamentally new types of weapons that will be based on new physical principles and high-tech technologies. Moreover, dual-use technology will have much more technology than those used in the production of current weapons. However, so far in practice the idea of ​​​​concentrating efforts on military R&D is not supported by appropriate budgetary resources. As a result, only for 1989-1995. there was a more than 10-fold decrease in funding for R&D in the field of military production. Today in Russia the budget allocated for this in dollar terms is 30 times less than in the United States, and 10 times less than in the European NATO countries. In addition, budget allocations are a target that has never been met in recent years. The percentage of actual defense R&D spending differs significantly from original plans.

Such meager funding has brought the scientific and design organizations of the military-industrial complex to a critical point, followed by a loss of reproductive potential, especially for high-tech weapons and military equipment. Its restoration will subsequently require significantly more funds than its current maintenance at the current level.

One of the negative results of the deteriorating financial situation of defense enterprises

Sharp obsolescence of equipment. Indeed, the insufficient level of investment in the technical re-equipment of functioning and mobilization capacities leads to their rapid moral and physical aging, which in the near future will undoubtedly affect the ability to produce modern weapons and military equipment. An analysis of the technical condition of the active part of the main production assets of the defense industry shows that a negative trend towards equipment obsolescence has been noticed in the industries. It is expected that by 2001 the number of equipment 20 years old will be half of the total.

Bibliography

• 1. Gladky Yu.N., Dobrosyuk V.A., Semenov S.P. Economic geography of Russia. M.: Gardarika, 1999.
• 2. Sidorov M.K. Socio-economic geography and regional studies of Russia. M.: Infra-M, 2002.
• 3. Economic and social geography of Russia, ed. Khrushcheva A.T. M.: Bustard, 2001.
• 4. Economic geography of Russia, ed. Vidyapina V.I., Stepanova M.V. M.: Infra-M, 2000.

We are arming the army so as not to fight.

BEFORE. Rogozin

Military-industrial complex(MIC) is part of the industrial complex of a country (group of countries), specializing in the scientific development and production of weapons, military equipment, providing them to the Armed Forces and other armed formations of the state.

The development of the military-industrial complex is decisively influenced by the country’s domestic and foreign policies, its military policy, the military-political situation in the world, the region, as well as the economic, scientific and technical capabilities of the country (group of countries).

History of the formation and development of the Military-Industrial Complex in Russia in the 20th century

The idea of ​​creating military-industrial committees in Russia was formulated in May 1915. In July 1915, the 1st Congress of Military-Industrial Committees took place. In August of the same year, a regulatory legal act was adopted that assigned to the committees the functions of assisting government agencies in supplying the army and navy with the necessary equipment and provisions through the planned distribution of raw materials and orders, their timely execution and setting prices.

To coordinate the actions of local committees in Petrograd, the Central Military-Industrial Committee was created, which formed a number of sections according to industries. Sections were created: mechanical, chemical, army supplies, clothing, food, sanitary, inventions, automobile, aviation, transportation, coal, oil, peat and forestry, mobilization, large projectiles, machine tools, etc.

By the beginning of 1916, 220 local Military Industrial Committees were created, united into 33 regional ones, and later their number increased.

The Chairman of the Central Military-Industrial Committee was first N.S. Avdakov, and then A.I. Guchkov.

The main task of the Military-Industrial Committees was the centralized receipt of government orders for the supply of military equipment and their placement at industrial enterprises.

Military-industrial committees became intermediaries between the state and private industry. The government provided the Military-Industrial Committees with a deduction of 1% of all government orders placed with the participation of the Military-Industrial Committees, which amounted to significant amounts.

Before the February Revolution of 1917, the Military-Industrial Committees received orders from the treasury worth about 400,000,000 rubles, but completed less than half.

In March 1918, after the 4th Congress of the Military-Industrial Committees, their enterprises and part of the apparatus were transformed into the People's Industrial Committees, which were abolished in October 1918.

In the USSR, the military-industrial complex as a set of separate and interconnected types of military production began to be created in the 1920s.

In 1927, in addition to the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR and the Main Directorate of Military Industry of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, the following were considered to perform “defense” functions:

• ? United State Political Administration under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR;
• ? Special technical bureaus;
• ? People's Commissariat of Railways;
• ? People's Commissariat of Trade;
• ? People's Commissariat of Postal and Telegraph;
• ? People's Commissariat of Labor;
• ? local air-chemical defense institutions.

A single center for their strategic and operational management

was the Council of Labor and Defense under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

In the 30s, the USSR military-industrial complex was able to supply the Armed Forces with modern weapons and military equipment at that time, and during the Great Patriotic War it was one of the decisive factors in the victory of the Soviet army.

After the Great Patriotic War, the composition of the institutions responsible for the formation of the Soviet military-industrial complex was transformed.

In 1957, in addition to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Defense Industry, the following were considered directly performing “defense” functions:

• ? Ministry of General Engineering;
• ? Ministry of Medium Engineering;
• ? Ministry of Aviation Industry;
• ? Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry;
• ? Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry;
• ? State Security Committee;
• ? State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy;
• ? Main Directorate of State Material Reserves;
• ? Main Engineering Directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations;
• ? Glavspetsstroy under Gosmontazhspetsstroy;
• ? Organization PO Box No. 10;
• ? DOSAAF;
• ? Central Committee "Dynamo";
• ? All-Army Military Hunting Society;

The centers of their strategic and operational management were the USSR Defense Council and the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues under the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The Soviet military-industrial complex had a vast geography. In various parts of the country there was intensive extraction of raw materials necessary for the production of atomic and nuclear weapons, production of small arms and artillery weapons, ammunition, production of tanks, airplanes and helicopters, shipbuilding, research and development work was carried out:

• S Aviation industry enterprises are available in almost all economic regions of the country, but they are most powerfully concentrated in Moscow and the Moscow region. Among the largest centers of the industry are Moscow (aircraft of the MiG, Su and Yak series, helicopters of the Mi series), Lyubertsy (Ka helicopters), Saratov (Yak aircraft), Kazan (Tu-160 aircraft, Mi helicopters), Taganrog (seaplanes A and Be ), Irkutsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Su aircraft), Arsenyev (An-74 aircraft, Ka series helicopters), Ulan-Ude (Su and MiG aircraft, Mi helicopters). Aviation engines are produced by enterprises in Kaluga, Moscow, Rybinsk, Perm, St. Petersburg, Ufa and other cities.
• S Production of rocket and space technology is one of the most important branches of the military-industrial complex. The largest research and development organizations in the industry are concentrated in Moscow, the Moscow region (Dubna, Korolev, Reutov, Khimki), Miass and Zheleznogorsk. Moscow and the Moscow region are also important centers for the production of rocket and space technology. Thus, ballistic missiles and long-term orbital stations were created in Moscow; in Korolev - ballistic missiles, artificial earth satellites, spaceships; aviation missiles of the air-to-surface class, in Zhukovsky - medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems, in Dubna anti-ship supersonic missiles, in Khimki - rocket engines for space systems (NPO Energomash). Ballistic missiles are produced by enterprises in Votkinsk (Topol-M), Zlatoust and Krasnoyarsk (for submarines). Rocket propulsion systems are produced in Voronezh, Perm, Nizhnyaya Salda and Kazan; various spacecraft
• - in Zheleznogorsk, Omsk, Samara. Unique launch equipment for rocket and space complexes is manufactured in Yurga.
• S Artillery weapons systems and spare parts for them are produced by enterprises in Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Perm (“Grad”, “Uragan”, “Smerch”), Podolsk and other cities.

WITH to his small arms Izhevsk, Kovrov, Tula (AK-74 assault rifle, SVD sniper rifle, AGS “Plamya” grenade launcher, smooth-bore weapons), Vyatskie Polyany are world famous. The development of unique small arms is carried out in Klimovsk.

WITH Main centers armored industry were Kharkov (T-54, T-64, T-80UD tanks, MT-LB armored tractors), Nizhny Tagil (T-55, T-62, T-72 tanks) and Omsk (T-80 tanks), Volgograd (armored personnel carriers ), Kurgan (infantry fighting vehicles) and Arzamas (armored vehicles).

C Military shipbuilding to this day it is concentrated in St. Petersburg (submarines, nuclear-powered missile cruisers), Severodvinsk (nuclear submarines), Nizhny Novgorod and Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

C Ammunition production mainly concentrated at numerous factories in the Central, Volga-Vyatka, Volga, Ural and West Siberian regions.

WITH Chemical weapons were produced for a long time by enterprises in Berezniki, Volgograd, Dzerzhinsk, Novocheboksarovsk and Chapaevsk. The main storage bases for chemical weapons are Gorny (Saratov region), Kambarka and Kizner (Udmurtia), Leonidovka (Penza region), Maradykovsky (Kirov region), Pochep (Bryansk region), Shchuchye (Kurgan region).

C Atomic weapons. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, uranium ore mining was carried out in many republics (RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Kazakh SSR, Uzbek SSR). Uranium oxide-oxide was produced by enterprises in the cities of Zheltye Vody (Ukraine, Dnepropetrovsk region), Stepnogorsk (Kazakhstan, Akmola region, Tselinny Mining and Chemical Plant), Chkalovsk (Tajikistan, Khujand region). Of the fairly numerous deposits of uranium ore in Russia, only one is currently being developed - in the area of ​​​​the city of Krasnokamensk in the Chita region. Here, at the Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Production Association, uranium concentrate is also produced. Uranium enrichment is carried out in Zelenogorsk, Novouralsk, Seversk and Angarsk. The centers for the production and separation of weapons-grade plutonium were Zheleznogorsk, Ozyorsk and Seversk (the production of weapons-grade plutonium there has now been discontinued). Nuclear weapons are collected in several cities (Zarechny, Lesnoy, Sarov, Trekhgorny). The largest scientific and production centers of the nuclear complex are Sarov and Snezhinsk (nuclear waste disposal is another branch of Snezhinsk’s specialization). Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs were tested at the Semipalatinsk test site (modern Kazakhstan) and at the Novaya Zemlya test site (Novaya Zemlya archipelago).

On the basis of the military-industrial complex, high-tech industries were created - aerospace, nuclear energy, television and radio engineering, electronics, biotechnology and others.

In the late 1980s, defense enterprises produced 20-25% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the defense industry: up to 3/4 of all research and development work (R&D) was carried out in the defense industry. Enterprises of the defense complex produced most of the civilian products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About 1/3 of the country's population lived in the area where enterprises of the military-industrial complex were located.

In general, by the beginning of the 1980s. The USSR became the world's first arms supplier (in terms of supply volume), ahead of even the United States in this regard. The Soviet military-industrial complex went beyond the boundaries of one state, becoming the most important force in the world economy and international relations.

The “exorbitant military burden” of the Soviet Union is often mentioned as an undoubted fact, and the figures are astonishing: the military expenditures of the USSR were allegedly calculated, according to Gorbachev (1990), at 20% of the gross national product (GNP).

This estimate significantly exceeds the data of official closed and open statistics, according to which military expenditures of the USSR were relatively modest: in 1968 - 16.7 billion rubles (2.6% of GNP at the 1980 level), 1975-1976 - 17.4 billion (2.8%), 1980-1984 - 17.1 billion (2.7%), 1987-20.2 billion (3.2%).

According to the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee O.D. Baklanov, responsible for the military-industrial complex, Gorbachev’s source of data was the Institute of the USA and Canada. At that time, Gorbachev was in dire need of arguments justifying the reduction of military spending in order to use this problem in the fight against the conservative opposition within the Central Committee. His foreign policy, based on “asymmetrical concessions” to the West on the issue of disarmament, by that time did not meet with understanding in the highest political circles of the USSR.

During the April 1987 negotiations on the issue of shorter and medium-range missiles, Gorbachev even had to exclude military representatives of the USSR from the discussion process so that they would not disrupt a compromise unfavorable for the USSR.

Meanwhile, the concessions began to be frankly humiliating. The agreements provided for large-scale arms reductions compared to NATO countries: the USSR was supposed to decommission and destroy 1,500 medium-range missiles, while the USA - 35O.

Under these conditions, Gorbachev had to either adjust his foreign policy course, or, in order to avoid accusations of capitulation, prove that the arms race was causing enormous damage to our economy. For this purpose, data from the Institute of the USA and Canada were used.

However, it later turned out that the share of military spending in the USSR amounted to 7.9% of GNP in 1989 (in the USA for the same year 5.5%), in 1990 - 6.9% (in the USA - 5.2%) . (US military spending is calculated using the Stockholm Peace Institute database, US GNP in 1980-1990 is based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce).

According to later calculations, the share of military expenditures in the GNP of the USSR in 1985 and 1986. was 8.4% and 8.1%, respectively.

The military expenditures of the USSR and the USA were thus quite comparable.

At the same time, the statistics for the USA did not take into account the conversion products of the military-industrial complex, while for the USSR this indicator was taken into account and greatly influenced the comparison. In the Soviet military-industrial complex, 45% of workers were engaged in the production of civilian products, a third of the innovative developments of military-industrial complex specialists were of a civilian nature.

What is the cause of the economic crisis of the USSR in the 1980s? According to the Russian political scientist, expert of the Russian Council on International Affairs N. Mendkovich, in 1985-1989. The Soviet Union was faced with a foreign trade balance problem, caused, among other things, by the fall in world oil prices. Together with a chaotic increase in capital investment in the economy and an increase in personal income, outpacing the growth of GNP, this caused a budget deficit, which had to be compensated by increasing the money supply and foreign loans. Of course, these budget problems were not the only reason for the collapse of the USSR, but they made a significant contribution to the negative processes of the late 1980s.

SAMPLE LIST OF DOCUMENTS FOR ENSURING THE ACTIVITIES OF A MILITARY PATRIOTIC CLUB (ASSOCIATION)

I. Approximate regulations on a military-patriotic club (association) at an educational institution.

1. General Provisions

Military-patriotic club (association), hereinafter referred to as the military-industrial complex, is a children's and youth public association created at an educational institution for the purpose of developing and supporting children's initiative in studying the history of domestic military art, weapons and military costume, mastering military professions, preparing youth for military service .


These Regulations do not apply to children's and youth commercial, political associations, organizations, and institutions.


The activities of the military-industrial complex are carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws “On public associations”, “On military duty and military service”, “On state support for youth and children's public associations”, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 16, 1996 No. 727 “On measures of state support for public associations working on military-patriotic education of youth, this Regulation, the Charter of the Military-Industrial Complex and other regulatory legal acts.


2. Tasks of the military-industrial complex


The tasks of the military-industrial complex are:


2-1. Instilling in the youth of the district love for the Motherland based on the best traditions of serving the Fatherland.


2-2. Implementation of state youth policy in the field of moral and patriotic education.


2-3. Preservation and enhancement of the glorious traditions of the Russian army.


1. Perpetuating the memory of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland.
   

   Assistance in preparing young people for military service.
   

   Development of technical and military applied sports.
   

   Formation of an active life position in adolescents.
   

Instilling in students a sense of love for the state symbols of the Russian Federation, respect for military rituals, and military uniforms.


3. Main activities of the military-industrial complex


The military-industrial complex carries out its activities under the leadership of the administration of the educational institution, and also interacts with organizations whose activities are aimed at spiritual
moral, patriotic and physical development of youth.


The military-industrial complex determines the profile of its activities, plans work and draws up training programs.


The military-industrial complex participates in search expeditions; construction, maintenance and care of memorials and monuments of military glory.


Conducts information and publishing activities in the field of development of citizenship and patriotism of youth.


3.6. Provides patronage assistance to veterans of the Great Patriotic War, labor and law enforcement agencies; to the families of military personnel who died in the line of duty.
4. Logistical support for the activities of the military-industrial complex


4.1. The activities of the military-industrial complex are supported by funds from:
4.1.1 Educational institution;


4.1.2. Received from membership fees, donations from sponsors, as well as other funds raised accumulated in the account of the educational institution.


4.2. Use of the military-industrial complex of the military training and material base
units, military educational institutions, as well as transfer to the military-industrial complex
(on the balance sheet of the OS) discontinued, written off and unused in
troops military equipment, uniforms, equipment is carried out
by agreement with the command of military units in accordance with current legislation.


4.3 The educational and material base of educational institutions and organizations that prepare young people for military service can be used by the military-industrial complex in the implementation of statutory tasks on a contractual basis in the prescribed manner


5. Support for the activities of the military-industrial complex


5 1. The district department of education, the Center for Patriotic and Civic Education provide comprehensive support to the activities of the military-industrial complex to develop citizenship and patriotism in children and adolescents;


1. They are developing regulatory legal acts to support the activities of the military-industrial complex.
   

   Organize and conduct training and methodological gatherings for leaders of the military-industrial complex.
   

   They publish informational, educational and methodological materials, visual aids, and produce videos about the activities of clubs for the spiritual, moral and civic-patriotic education of youth.
   

   They assist in establishing military patronage ties between the military-industrial complex and organizations, enterprises, creative and labor groups.
   

   5.2. Military commissariats:
   

Inform pre-conscripts and persons discharged from military service about the activities of the military-industrial complex.


Take into account the training profile of military-industrial complex students when determining the type and type of troops of the Armed Forces, as well as other
troops, military formations and bodies when they are called up for military service.


6. Management of the activities of the military-industrial complex


The management of the activities of the military-industrial complex is carried out in accordance with its own Charter, Regulations and current legislation.


Control over the work of military-patriotic clubs and recording their number is carried out by the Moscow Department of Education. The Center for Military-Patriotic and Civil Education of the Moscow Department of Education is organizing a methodological
the work of the military-industrial complex, plans and conducts city patriotic events with military-patriotic clubs.


To coordinate the activities of the military-industrial complex, a military-industrial complex board of trustees can be created, which includes parents of students, leaders of the military-industrial complex, representatives of executive authorities, local government, the founding organization, military registration and enlistment offices, as well as other legal entities and individuals promoting the development of citizenship and patriotism of youth.


7. Notes


7.1. Taking into account the specifics of educational institutions, military-industrial complex leaders can develop documents on the activities of clubs
independently, based on these Regulations and current legislation.


II. Model Charter


military-patriotic club (association)


1. General Provisions


A military-patriotic club (association) (hereinafter referred to as the military-industrial complex) is opened on the basis of an educational institution (or other organization) on the initiative of the teaching staff with the permission of senior management.


2. The main goals and objectives of the club:


- education in the spirit of devotion to the Fatherland;


— formation of civil-patriotic views and an active life position, activities for the benefit of society;


— intellectual, cultural and moral development of pupils, improvement of their moral and psychological state and adaptation to life in society, development of a sense of collectivism; positive attitude towards a healthy lifestyle, physical development of the younger generation;

feelings of loyalty to constitutional and military duty, discipline, a conscientious attitude to study, one’s duties and the desire to achieve the assigned task;


preparation for serving the Fatherland in the civil and military fields.


3. Organization of the educational process


The educational process should be carried out on the basis of training programs for various types of activities, taking into account methodological requirements that reveal the technology for conducting theoretical and practical disciplines (Law of the Russian Federation “On Education”). Club teachers should be guided in their work by notes and lesson plans for various types of classes.


The academic year in the military-industrial complex begins in September and ends in May.


To implement the main goals and objectives of the educational and educational process, the leadership of the military-industrial complex uses a variety of forms and methods of work:


• classes in military-applied and technical sports;
  

classes in history, regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, drill training, humanitarian and civil law, basic medical training, study of the heroic and cultural past of the Fatherland;


organizes and conducts competitions in military applied sports, rallies, sports days, military sports games;

- takes part in regional, regional and city events of a patriotic nature (participation in events dedicated to the days of military glory of Russia, meetings with representatives of veteran organizations, with soldiers of the Russian army, organizes trips to places of military glory, participates in the restoration and protection of architectural and historical monuments and military glory of Russia, etc.).

4. Pupils of the military-patriotic club (association).

Their rights and responsibilities.

Pupils of this voluntary social and patriotic organization can be children and youth from 10-11 years old until graduation from an educational institution, who recognize the Charter of the club (association) and actively implement its program. Religion, nationality and gender do not matter.

A student of a military-patriotic club (association) MUST:

be a patriot of our Motherland;

comply with the requirements of this Charter, comply with the decisions of the leaders of the club (association);


take initiative and actively participate in all military-industrial complex events;


comply with ethical standards and rules of social behavior (do not drink alcohol, do not smoke, do not use foul language, be neat);


be an active participant in public life at the place of study and residence;


treat the material and technical base of the military-industrial complex with care (take care of the club’s premises and sports grounds, clothing, sports equipment, etc.).


III. Sample passport


military-patriotic club (association)


(full name of the club, association)

Location, direction of activity (goals and objectives) -


Date of creation, org., founder.


Full address (with index) of the association, telephone numbers, fax.


Head (full name, position, teaching experience).

5 Number of pupils:

Total

Of them:

Boys 11 -14 years old

Girls 11 -14 years old

Boys 15-17 years old _____________________

Girls 15-17 years old

6. Number of instructors, teachers

Total

Including:

staff

on a voluntary basis

Documents regulating the activities of the association (regulations, charter, programs in various areas of educational and educational activities, etc., the time of their creation.


The governing body of the association (among students and among organizers-teachers).


Cooperation with other public (including veteran) organizations.


10. Characteristics of the educational and material base (basic classes
educational institution, other premises allocated for temporary use; playgrounds, sports equipment, pneumatic weapons (number of copies), equipment for hand-to-hand combat, tourist equipment, etc.).


11. Symbols of the association (motto, emblem, text of a solemn promise, oath, anthem, etc.).


12. Additional information.


IV. Sample programs, plans, lesson plans


in various areas of activity


military-patriotic club


(associations)


They are developed independently taking into account the direction of the association’s activities.